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IN THE  
SUPREME COURT  
OF THE  
STATE OF IDAHO 
Supreme Court Case Number : 45697 
Bonneville County District Court Number: CV-2016-5707  
 
SHAD LEWIS HAMBERLIN, 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
vs. 
JORDAIN LEANN BRADFORD, 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho,  
in and for Bonneville County 
Hon. Joel E. Tingey, District Judge 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
RESPONDENT/APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF 
 
Larren K. Covert 
Swafford Law, PC 
 Kristopher Meek 
 Beard St. Clair Gafney 
655 S. Woodruff Ave.  2105 Coronado St 
Idaho Falls, ID 83401  Idaho Falls, ID 83804 
Attorneys for the Defendant  Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
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I. DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERROR IN APPLYING A REASONABLE 
PERSON STANDARD TO A MOTION TO SET ASIDE A VAP UNDER I.C.§7-1106(2)? 
 Shad argues that the plain language of Idaho Code §7-1106(2) requires this Court to enter 
into a statutory interpretation. This is completely incorrect.  
 “The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent.” State v. 
Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007). “Because ‘the best guide to 
legislative intent is the words of the statute itself,’ the interpretation of a statute must begin with 
the literal words of the statute.” Id. (quoting In re Permit No. 36–7200, 121 Idaho 819, 824, 828 
P.2d 848, 853 (1992)). When language is unambiguous, there is no reason for a court to consider 
rules of statutory construction. Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc. v. Ada Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 157 
Idaho 180, 184–85, 335 P.3d 25, 29–30 (2014). A statute is ambiguous when: 
[T]he meaning is so doubtful or obscure that reasonable minds 
might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning. However, 
ambiguity is not established merely because different possible 
interpretations are presented to a court. If this were the case then 
all statutes that are the subject of litigation could be considered 
ambiguous.... [A] statute is not ambiguous merely because an 
astute mind can devise more than one interpretation of it. 
Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Green River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho 853, 
856, 318 P.3d 622, 625 (2014) (alterations in original) (quoting 
BHA Invs., Inc. v. City of Boise, 138 Idaho 356, 358, 63 P.3d 482, 
484 (2003)).  
 
 In this matter, the interpretative question of the statute is if the legislative intent was to 
require the application of a reasonable person standard to the recession of the VAP.  
 The actual words of the statute at issue are. “(2) After the period for rescission, an 
executed acknowledgment of paternity may be challenged only in court on the basis of fraud, 
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duress, or material mistake of fact, with the burden of proof upon the party challenging the 
acknowledgment.” I.C. § 7-1106(2).  
 It is immediately clear that a reasonable person standard is not articulated in the actual, 
clear and unambiguous language of the statute. Shad argues that a reasonable person standard 
must be the legislative intent, as at the time of the 1996 amendment, “Idaho jurisprudence was 
replete with interpretation of the analogous provision allowing judgments to be set aside on the 
grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
Rule 60(b)(1).” Respondent’s Brief p. 10. While it is true that at the time of amendment, IRCP 
60(b)(1) was in place and there had been many cases examining the findings for “mistake,” it 
must also be noted and examined that despite this replete jurisprudence, the legislature did not 
include a reasonable person standard in the statute, nor did the legislature simply require a 
“mistake” as contained in Rule 60(b)(1). The legislature set the requirement as a “fraud, duress, 
or material mistake of fact.” The legislature did not include any of the language from IRCP 
60(b)(1), rather the legislature used language related to contracts and the standards for relieving a 
party from a contract.  
 A material mistake of fact is contract evaluation tool used to relieve a party from 
performance of a contract. This term comes with its own Idaho jurisprudence setting forth the 
requirements for utilization. “[A] mistake is an unintentional act or omission arising from 
ignorance, surprise, or misplaced confidence. The mistake must be material, that is, so 
substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties.” Leydet v. City of Mountain 




 It is this language and jurisprudence the legislature utilized in its decision to not use the 
word “mistake” but to utilize the term “material mistake of fact” in the language of I.C.§7-
1106(2).  
 Shad’s assertion that utilizing the language of the statue would result in an absurd 
application is grossly self-serving and unsupported. The jurisprudence of a material mistake of 
fact in contract law extends back before Idaho was a state. In Alan v. Hammond, 36 U.S.63 
(1837) the United States Supreme Court indicated that a contract entered into by mistake fails as 
there is no assent to the contract. Later, in 1876 the United States Supreme Court in Utley v. 
Donaldson, 94 U.S. 29 stated, “Where there is a misunderstanding as to any thing material, the 
requisite mutuality of assent as to such thing is wanting; consequently the supposed contract does 
not exist, and neither party is bound.” Here the material mistake insulates itself into American 
jurisprudence. The Idaho Supreme Court has stated, “A mistake may justify grounds for relief if 
it si so substantial and fundamental that it defeats the object of the parties.” Maroun v. Wyreless 
Sys., Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 611, 114 P.3d 974, 981 (2005), abrogated on other issues by 
Wandering Trails, LLC v. Big Bite Excavation, Inc., 156 Idaho 586, 329 P.3d 368 (2014).  
 The existence of a legal principle for 181 years seems to indicate that its use does not 
result in an absurd application.  
 The final argument by Shad states that a public policy should exist to preclude the 
implementation of the “material mistake of fact” standard for a rescission of a VAP. The public 
policy as to the rescission of a VAP should be to allow for the identification and legal acceptance 
of a biological parent and not the furtherance of a fiction based on a material mistake.  
 As the plain language of I.C. §7-1106 does not include the requirement of a reasonable 
person analysis either in the statute or the interpretation of the “material mistake of fact” 
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provision. The District Court erred in applying this standard for the review of the Jordain’s 
Motion to Rescind  the VAP. Any analysis of the “material mistake of fact” provision should be 
pursuant to the contract jurisprudence that mirrors the language used by the legislature. This 
analysis should require an evaluation if the mistake was an unintentional act or omission arising 
from ignorance, surprise, or misplaced confidence and that the mistake be material, that is, so 
substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties.  
 In this matter, the mistake by Jordain was the unintentional act of identifying Shad as the 
father of her child based on her ignorance in remembering the physical encounters with 
Matthew. This mistake is absolutely material as it defeats the intention of Jordain to correctly 
identify the father of T.J.H. 
 The determination of the District Court should be reversed and the VAP in this matter 
rescinded.  
II. DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERROR IN DETERMINING THAT JORDAIN DID 
NOT ACT AS A REASONABLE PERSON? 
As noted above, the reasonable and prudent person standard does not apply to a 
rescission of a VAP. Therefore any findings of the District Court by the District Court on this 
matter are irrelevant and an abuse of discretion. 
Should any analysis of a reasonable person be reviewed, the District Court erred in its 
analysis as the actions of Jordain as set forth in her pleadings satisfy the requirement. 
Additionally, the absence of any other facts to counter those set forth by Jordain show an abuse 
of discretion and there is no contrary evidence to weigh.  





 In this matter, the District Court erred in imposing a reasonable person requirement into 
the statute where none existed and then in not finding Jordain acted as a reasonable person. 
Jordain presented, by clear and convincing evidence that she acted under a material mistake of 
fact when she signed the VAP in July, 2014. This mistake resulted in her stating that Shad was 
the father of T.J.H. when he was not. This Court should vacate the Order of the Magistrate Court 
and District Court denying the rescission of the VAP and rescind the VAP based on Jordain’s 
uncontradicted material mistake of fact.  
 




      Larren K. Covert, Esq. 
      Of Swafford Law, PC 
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